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Abstract. The protection of long-lived sensitive information puts enor-
mous stress on traditional ciphers, to survive generations of cryptana-
lysts. In addition, there is a continued risk of adversaries penetrating
and attacking the systems in which these ciphers are implemented. In
this paper, we present our work-in-progress on an approach to survive
both cryptanalysis and intrusion attacks for extended periods of time.
A prime objective of any similar work is to prevent the leakage of plain-
texts. However, given the long lifespan of sensitive information, during
which cryptanalysts could focus on breaking the cipher, it is equally im-
portant to prevent leakage of unduly high amounts of ciphertext. Our
approach consists in an enclave-based architectural set-up bringing in
primary resilience against attacks, seconded by permanently reencrypt-
ing portions of the conﬁdential or privacy-sensitive data with fresh keys
and combining ciphers in a threshold-based encryption scheme.
1 Introduction
Many application areas today produce enormous amounts of privacy or oth-
erwise sensitive data and metadata while often underestimating its longevity.
Human genotypes, sequenced for research and medicine, are a prominent exam-
ple of such data as it combines long-time valuable information with a general
desire to keep this data online accessible for medical research and other applica-
tions 1. Current next generation machines sequence genotypes at an enormous
pace of around 1011 raw base pairs per day. As a result, the costs of sequencing
a human's DNA dropped below 1000 USD, and more and more genotypes are
? This work is partially supported by the Fonds National de la Recherche Luxembourg
(FNR) through PEARL grant FNR/P14/8149128.
1 In fact we have selected genomic information for precisely this combination, but
for the remainder of this paper and in hindsight of the workshop, please consider
it as onyl one example of information with such properties and possibly not the
best one. The interested reader is here directed to the transcript of the talk and the
controversial discussion it triggered.
2being sequenced, with protective measures barely keeping pace. Besides indica-
tors allowing unique identiﬁcation of individuals in a group, DNA may carry
also stigmatizing information such as an individual's susceptibility to illnesses
and its sensitivity to drugs.
DNA inheritance is a perfect example of an often overlooked aspect of sensi-
tive data: its longevity. Such long lived data, originally collected in a legal way
(e.g., to diagnose a patient), may be used for less ethical reasons in the future.
For example, one could imagine the political impact in a presidential election
if indicators for a serious disease in the genotype of a candidate's ancestor are
made public. These threats are neither science ﬁction nor do they go unnoticed.
For example, Melissa Gymrek and colleagues [1] were able to re-identify 13.1%
of the donors contributing to the 1000-genome project, even though their data
was anonymized, and Backes et al. [2] warned about the potential erosion of
genomic privacy.
Naturally, a wealth of solutions exist at the protocol level, including syn-
chronous [3][5] and asynchronous [6], [7] proactive secret sharing approaches [8]
to limit the time of share exposure in (t, n)-threshold ciphers [9]. The (t, n)-
threshold thereby ensures that attackers, who are able to compromise up to t−1
out of n locations while reencrypting shares every epoch of size T prevents adver-
saries from recombining secrets learned at diﬀerent epochs. Similarly, an eﬃcient
proactive encryption scheme [10] is also introduced to periodically update the
secret keys for decryption. In particular, there is a unique public key in the sys-
tem for data encryption, and this public key and all ciphertexts in the system
do not need to be updated. All secret keys are updated periodically, in the way
that a suﬃcient number of the secret keys in any single epoch can decrypt the
data encrypted using the non-changed public key. So, all users in the system
only need to remember a single public key, and use this single public key for
encryption in the life time of the system, even though the corresponding secret
keys (possessed by the corresponding decryption servers) are updated. However,
with data whose life-spans exceed 50 years, we must also take into account two
further threats:
T1. long-term cryptanalysis using leaked ciphertexts and
T2. revealed vulnerabilities of ciphers, both at the protocol level and below.
The contributions we are working on are therefore:
1. a system architecture to safely consolidate shares in a single location while
limiting the probability of revealing plaintext but, equally important, of the
rate at which ciphertext can be revealed; and
2. a heterogeneous (multi-cipher) proactive sharing scheme to mask vulnera-
bilities in individual ciphers, in their implementation or in the execution
environment they execute in.
It is paramount to consider system-level attacks while constructing novel ciphers
because the protection of many systems is ﬂimsy at best. For an account of
the protection state of sensitive systems, consider the recent testimony given in
3front of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform [11] where US
Department of Homeland Security revealed that it still relies on known to be
insecure Windows 2003 server installations with a transition planned only for the
ﬁscal year 2018. Combined with the increasing availability and sophistication of
tools to penetrate and attack systems, this positions data loss as one of the most
paramount risks long-lived information is facing, even if data is revealed partially
or fully encrypted.
2 Threat Model
In this work, we consider threats mounted by external attackers on computer
systems used to process data whose value remains high for several generations.
Attackers may eventually escalate privileges and become insiders, but must
attain their goals through remote exﬁltration of information. Thus, we exclude
attackers with local and/or physical access, or any other kind of attacks whose
attainable ciphertext extraction bandwidth exceeds the practical bounds of any
reencryption system our system may use. Indeed, such insiders might simply
steal or copy the disks. In particular, we therefore assume appropriate access
restrictions and supervision of maintenance works. We assume a locally syn-
chronous setting with reliable timing information available to all components
and shielded from attacks. Network-only access and hypervisor-only adjustable
timers justify this assumption.
We generally assume advanced and persistent threats and highly skilled ad-
versaries capable of penetrating any exposed system. More precisely,
1. adversaries penetrate systems from the outside through any possible connec-
tion and proceed from there to penetrate further components;
2. adversaries can only exﬁltrate information by remote means (including covert
channels), with a bounded and known extraction bandwidth;
3. adversaries have unlimited external storage for storing plain- and ciphertexts;
and
4. they will eventually learn about prospective vulnerabilities in the ciphers or
their implementation.
However, we assume the impenetrability of trusted-trustworthy components and
a suﬃciently strong isolation of enclaves to limit data exchange between com-
promised entities to a bandwidth bounded by bmax .
Our working hypothesis, which remains to be validated as part of our future
work, is that given an assumption about the minimal amount C of ciphertext
needed for a successful cryptanalysis attack  even taking into consideration
vulnerabilities, which may shrink the search space and diminish that amount 
by restricting the amount of ciphertext material an adversary may extract to be
less than C, we maintain conﬁdentiality.
4Fig. 1. Permanent reencryption architecture
3 Permanently Reencrypting Enclaves
To address on the one side potential future compromises of ciphers (both at the
protocol and implementation levels) and, on the other side, breakthroughs in
cryptanalysis and improvements of adversarial computing power, we take a more-
shots-on-goal approach and use diversity, through a collection of replaceable
encryption algorithms to protect the conﬁdentiality (and likewise integrity and
privacy) of stored data and metadata.
More precisely, on the architectural side, which we depict in Figure 1, we
decouple the data vaults from the networked legacy operating system (OS) by
channeling all accesses through our reENC 2 component. Our goal is to limit the
rate at which the ciphertexts of sensitive data are revealed to adversaries. We
do not preclude covert channels and similar means to communicate between the
data vaults and the networked legacy OS as long as the bandwidth between the
two is lower than an upper bound bmax . In particular, we do not preclude the
possibility of vulnerabilities in the legacy OSs (network and storage) and hence
the possibility of compromise. reENC 2 is the trusted-trustworthy permanent
reencryption enclave in our hybrid system design [12], whose role is to mediate
user access to the data vault for operations (ideally directly on the ciphertext [13],
but if necessary also by decrypting the data, and by reencrypting it after these
operations complete). The actual operations are thereby located in user-provided
enclaves uj , which receive the decrypted data after successfully passing an access
control check. Moreover, uj communication is sanitized by reENC
2 to prevent
unintended exposure of plaintext. We assume existence of suﬃciently strong
data sanitizers for all user operations and leave it as future work to construct
such trusted-trustworthy sanitizers (possibly by requesting a proof of how uj
processes the data, which can then be matched against the data-release policy).
Ciphers plug into reENC 2 and are provided the keys and data to process.
The coupling has to be such that faults do not spread to other enclaves or to the
legacy OS. Dedicated access to FPGA-based implementations or software imple-
mentations with dedicated message buﬀers are examples of such a decoupling.
Besides granting access and redirecting data into user enclaves, the second
primary role of reENC 2 is to permanently read data from the vault and reen-
5crypt it with a fresh key and periodically also with a fresh cipher. To prevent a
compromised data vault from keeping old data and, by this, from extending the
time of ciphertext exposure, we redirect the output of reencryption to a fresh
data vault and recycle the resources of old vaults once their data is transferred.
Let v be the number of data vaults. We anticipate vaults are executed in
parallel. Hence, illegitimate channels between the vaults and the untrusted legacy
OS have a maximal bandwidth of vbmax . Let ci be the amount of ciphertext kept
in vault i. Then adversaries are able to exﬁltrate the tolerated fraction θ of ci
within
Tleak =
θ mini(ci)
bmax
. (1)
To prevent leakage of a large enough fraction of ciphertext, vaults have to be
rejuvenated faster than Tleak . From this we can derive minimal bandwidth re-
quirements between reENC 2 and the old and new data vault of
bparmin =
2
∑
i ci
Tleak
(2)
in case of parallel re-encryption and of
bseqmin = v b
lpar
min (3)
for sequential re-encryption of one enclave at a time.
3.1 Long-Term Data Encryption
The remaining questions are now: How can we encrypt data such that we dras-
tically reduce the dependence on the correctness of a cipher? and How, by
reencrypting the data, can we maintain this situation for the life-span of the
data?. The properties which must be enforced are that:
1. all data that is encrypted with a given key needs to be reencrypted with
a fresh key before the adversary gets hold of enough ciphertext material to
succeed in the cryptanalysis of this data; and
2. all data that is encrypted with a given algorithm must be reencrypted with an
alternative algorithm, before an adversary learns how to break the algorithm
(e.g., once a vulnerability is discovered).
Of course, adversaries may learn about zero-day exploits before an algorithm is
replaced. To keep our long-living data protected, we therefore propose a proactive
two-stage encryption scheme, using techniques drawing from fault and intrusion
tolerance, where we combine f1-threshold crypto with f2-cipher diversity, where
f1+1 and f2+1, respectively the number of shares to be captured and the number
of diverse ciphers to be broken, for a successful attack, deﬁne the parametric
protection of the data. By putting the evaluation of these parameters in context
with the above-mentioned C parameter, in a real system, we claim that we will
be able to reduce the probability of a successful attack below a tolerable residual
risk, over a long life span. We plan to evaluate our approach through a security
analysis and ﬁeld experiments.
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